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No mental state examination would be complete without a
statement relating to abnormalities of perception.
According to Fish, perceptual abnormalities may be
classiﬁed as either sensory distortions (e.g. hyperacusis
and dysmegalopsia) or sensory deceptions (e.g. illusions and
hallucinations), with both categories deviating from
veridical perception.1 The clean simplicity of this deﬁnition
underlies part of its clinical utility, but also gives the
impression that the characteristics of ‘normal’ veridical
perception are well understood. The nature of perception,
however, has troubled philosophers for centuries,2,3 and has
been the focus of intense investigation by neuroscientists
and psychologists in recent decades.4-7 Just how does the
brain transform the light hitting the retina into the
inﬁnitely complex three-dimensional world that we see
when we open our eyes? How much of what we perceive is
really present in the sensory data hitting our eyes, and to
what extent do our prior expectations shape our
perception? Do we perceive the world as it really is, and if
not, does that mean that our normal perceptions are
distorted or deceptive? If so, in what way does normal
perception differ from abnormal perception? These
questions may seem to be only of philosophical relevance,
but researchers working in the ﬁelds of perceptual
neuroscience and computer vision are regularly confronted
by them.
In this article we outline some exciting insights into
how the brain may construct reality. Intriguingly, these
ﬁndings have come from the ﬁeld of machine learning, a
branch of computer science and robotics.
The problem of perception
How does your visual system construct a representation of
the world? Perhaps most readers would reply that the brain
extracts the information about the physical world that is
contained within incoming sensory signals. Much of the
neuroscience of the past half-century has investigated
perceptual processing starting from this assumption.4,8
The account of perceptual processing found in most
undergraduate textbooks states that the sensory processing
pathway (including the sensory epithelia, subcortical nuclei,
thalamus, sensory cortices and heteromodal association
cortices) extracts information from incoming sensory data
in a stepwise manner. If all goes smoothly we perceive the
world ‘as it really is’.
There are several problems, however, with the view that
perception proceeds by extracting information from the
incoming signals alone. Perhaps the most damning
consideration was recognised by George Berkeley in the
18th century as the ‘inverse optics’ problem,2,4 which states
that information collected by the sensory epithelia is
insufﬁcient to allow an unambiguous mapping back on to
real-world sources. The light hitting the retina, for example,
forms a two-dimensional image, which has an inﬁnite
number of possible three-dimensional ‘real-world’ sources.
The image conﬂates information about object illumination,
reﬂectance and transmittance.4 Computer vision faces
similar problems. A car, for example, looks different from
different viewing angles and distances, and in different
lighting conditions. The problem of inferring the state of
the world from sensory data alone is (mathematically)
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ill-posed.9 One powerful illustration of this principle is
demonstrated by the famous Necker cube illusion,5
where the sensory information alone is insufﬁcient to
resolve the question of the orientation of the wire cube
and there is no simple mapping between sensory data
and perception (Fig. 1).
Expectation is necessary for perception
If sensory data alone cannot support perception, how does
the brain create accurate perceptual representations of
the world? It is now appreciated that ill-posed problems
such as vision can be made tractable by using contextual
information to impose constraints on the interpretation of
ambiguous data. In the case of vision, for example, past
experiences of seeing similar visual scenes sets up
expectations about the likely current state of the world,
and any new sensory data are interpreted in light of these
expectations. Consistent with this hypothesis, the sensory
processing pathways in the brain do not just support one-way
‘bottom-up’ information ﬂow (from low-level data in the
primary sensory cortex to more complex representations in
heteromodal association cortices), but also support ‘top-
down’ information ﬂow, whereby information about the
current expected state of the world cascades down from
high cortical areas to inﬂuence information processing in
low sensory areas.9,10 Some have argued that the ‘heavy
lifting’ of perceptual processing is performed by these
top-down pathways, which make predictions about the state
of the world that are tested against sensory data.10
The ability of the brain to make sense of sensory
information has inspired computer scientists working on
computer vision and similar problems to take a similar
approach. Recently, researchers at Google created an
impressive visual recognition system using a processing
architecture inspired by the human brain, called an
‘artiﬁcial neural network’ (ANN).11 ANNs consist of artiﬁcial
‘neurons’ that are organised into layers, reminiscent of the
brain’s hierarchical organisation. These networks are
particularly good at detecting features and patterns in
new data, and using these features to perform classiﬁcation
tasks. This is similar to what the brain does when engaged in
perceptual inference, which may be thought of as the
detection of objects and meaningful patterns in sensory
data. New data enter the ANN at the lowest ‘input’ layer
(analogous to light hitting light-sensitive neurons in the
retina) and is processed sequentially by progressively higher
layers of the network. At each layer the network attempts to
extract patterns and features from these data, with higher
layers of the network extracting increasingly more abstract
features. At the highest layer a ‘decision’ is made about what
the data represent.
Importantly, a new ANN must be adequately ‘trained’
before it can perform successful pattern detection and
classiﬁcation tasks. During training the network is exposed to
many different data-sets (e.g. images) and attempts to classify
the data appropriately. The network is able to self-calibrate,
guided by its successes and errors, in a process analogous to
synaptic plasticity. After exposure to thousands of images of,
say, cats, the network learns to recognise cats in images to
which it has never before been exposed.
The well-trained ANN is primed to recognise salient
features and patterns in new data in much the same way
that the brain is primed to recognise the patterns in sensory
data that are most important for detecting behaviourally
relevant objects. Prior to training, the ANN is essentially
blind to meaningful patterns in new data. In both the
well-trained ANN and the mature human visual system
the ﬁnal decision about what a new image represents is the
product of a delicate balance between the information
contained within the image itself and the readiness of the
network to detect certain features within new data.9,10
Tipping the balance
Perception is therefore the product of two sources of
information: the sensory data and prior expectations about
the sort of information that the sensory data contain. What
happens, however, when prior expectations are given too
much weight?
The Google researchers provide an intuitive example of
the problems that inappropriately strong prior expectations
can cause in their ANN.11 As mentioned previously, the
highest layers of the ANN contain latent representations of
objects that the network has been trained to see. The Google
researchers asked a network trained to see bananas to
detect and enhance ‘banana-like’ features in an image that
contained only meaningless noise. This manipulation
inappropriately weighted prior expectation relative to
sensory data. The result was that the network was able to
‘perceive’ objects where none existed in the image itself
(akin to a ‘guided hallucination’) (see the Google Research
Blog article for examples11). Although the mechanisms
employed by this simple network manipulation are not
intended to be biologically plausible, the simple experiment
demonstrates the power that inappropriately held prior
expectations might have on resulting perception.
To what extent can inappropriately held prior
expectations inﬂuence human perception? This question has
relevance to descriptive psychopathology and psychiatry.
Karl Jaspers, the father of descriptive psychopathology,
postulated that ‘illusions due to affect’ and ‘illusions due to
inattentiveness’ may arise when a person has a strong prior
expectation about the state of the world and is confronted
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Fig 1 The Necker Cube illusion is a bistable visual illusion. The same
sensory data are able to support two perceptual inferences (one
in which corner 1 is closest to the observer, the other in which
corner 2 is closest).
with noisy and ambiguous sensory data.12 This exaggerated
prior expectation may be informed by the semantic context
of a situation (in what have come to be termed ‘completion
illusions’), the observer’s current emotional state13 (in
‘affect illusions’), or active imaginative processes acting
on inherently ambiguous sensory data (in ‘pareidolic
illusions’).1,12,14,15 It may be argued that in these situations
the observer comes to impose their prior expectations on
the ambiguous sensory data.
Contemporary accounts of hallucinations
We have argued that perceptual inference always relies
on both incoming sensory data and a prior expectation
about what these data are likely to represent. Additionally,
we have outlined the hypothesis that illusions and
hallucinations may be the result of an imbalance between
these two sources of information. This simple account is
consistent with contemporary theories of illusions and
hallucinations, which also implicate a miscalibration
between these two sources of evidence.
One of the most inﬂuential contemporary accounts of
perceptual inference is that of hierarchical predictive
coding.9,16,17 At the heart of the predictive coding
account is the notion that the brain maintains a dynamic
representation of the world, which is the brain’s best
prediction about the state that the world is likely to be
in. Incoming sensory data are compared against this
representation. If there is a good match between the prior
prediction and the sensory data the current representation
of the state of the world is reinforced. If there is a mismatch,
a ‘prediction error’ signal drives an updating of the brain’s
current representation of the world, which is subsequently
re-tested against the real-world data. The iterative process
of matching the brain’s predictions to sensory signals
underlies perceptual inference.10,16,17 This process can
become disrupted when the balance between prior
predictions and incoming sensory data is changed. The
brain’s internal representation of the world will be resistant
to change, and thus dominate perceptual inference, if the
prior prediction is given a greater weight than the incoming
sensory data, as may happen when the incoming sensory
data are noisy.9,16,17 It has been proposed that in some
pathological states the brain may mistake its own prior
predictions for new incoming sensory data, resulting in
perceptual and cognitive abnormalities that share some
similarity to acute psychosis.18
Another inﬂuential account of complex visual
hallucinations is the perception and attention deﬁcit (PAD)
model, which was developed after studying clinical
populations who experience recurrent complex visual
hallucinations.19 It was found that people in these
populations had combined deﬁcits in low-level sensory
processing and attention. The PAD model proposes that in
order to perceive an object, the perceptual object must ﬁrst
be selected from a pool of candidate ‘proto-objects’, in a
process guided by sensory data, prior expectations and
attentional processes. In people who have a combined
deﬁcit in sensory processing and attention it is conceivable
that proto-objects from a misrepresentative pool become
inappropriately bound to the visual scene, resulting in a
hallucination.19
Both the predictive coding and PAD accounts of
illusions and hallucinations propose that an overweighting
of prior expectation relative to sensory data may underlie
certain perceptual abnormalities. This overweighting may
be a direct result of inappropriately held prior expectations
(as can occur in states of high emotional arousal), or may be
secondary to a decrease in the quality (or precision) of
incoming sensory data (as may occur in states of low
attention, fatigue or sensory impairment).19,20
Limitations
There are several limitations and unanswered questions
in this ‘expectation-based’ model of hallucinations and
illusions. First, although Google’s ANN provides a nice
visual example of the power of overweighted prior
expectation, it has key structural and functional differences
when compared with the human visual system. Among these
are the fact that Google’s network hierarchy has many more
layers than our current best estimates in the primate
brain.11,21 Moreover, Google’s network was trained to ‘see’
objects in a ‘supervised’ way, whereby it was told what the
images actually represented during training. This bears little
resemblance to the ‘unsupervised’ learning that occurs in
the brain.
Perhaps more importantly, expectation-based accounts
of illusions and hallucinations fall short of explaining
some of the most frequently encountered perceptual
abnormalities in clinical practice. The hallucinations
recounted by patients with psychosis or organic disorders
are often bizarre, and seem entirely unexpected given the
environmental context.19 Furthermore, although the
account of hallucinations given above applies to all sensory
modalities, it is unclear why perceptual abnormalities
often occur preferentially in one sensory modality in
clinical populations (e.g. auditory verbal hallucinations in
schizophrenia).15 These questions remain unanswered, and
pose an ongoing challenge for computational accounts of
perceptual abnormalities in psychiatry.
Conclusions
Although psychiatrists ask patients about perceptual
abnormalities on a daily basis, it is not often that we stop
to ponder what actually distinguishes normal perceptions
from perceptual distortions and deceptions. Current work
in psychology, neuroscience and computer science paints a
picture of normal perception as being inextricably linked to
prior expectations about the state of the world. Perception
depends on a delicate balance between the sensory
information that we are confronted with, and the prior
expectations we have about the world. If the balance is
disturbed then perceptual inference becomes disrupted.
Without prior expectations, perception is a mathematically
ill-posed problem4,9 (as illustrated by Fig. 1), yet when prior
expectation dominates the perceptual process, humans (and
ANNs) can come to perceive objects which do not exist in
the sensory data. As a result, the division between veridical
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perception and perceptual distortions or deceptions is more
subtle than one of clear qualitative difference.
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